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We provide new evidence on patterns of structural change in advanced economies, 
reconsidering the stylised facts put forward by Kaldor (1967), Kuznets (1971) and Maddison 
(1980). Since 1980 the services sector has overwhelmingly predominated in the economic 
activity of the European Union, Japan and the U.S., but there is substantial heterogeneity 
among services. Personal, finance and business services have low productivity growth and 
increasing shares in employment and GDP. By contrast, shares of distribution services are 
constant and productivity growth is rapid. We find that the labour share in value added is 
declining, while the use of ICT-capital and skilled labour is increasing in all sectors and 
regions.   
 
* Corresponding author. 
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I. Introduction 
 
More than three decades ago, Nicholas Kaldor, Simon Kuznets and Angus Maddison 
established a number of empirical regularities in the structural transformation of advanced 
economies (Kaldor, 1963; Kuznets, 1971; Maddison, 1980). Kuznets and Maddison described 
the canonical shifts of output and labour first from agriculture to industry, and later on from 
industry to services. In addition, they suggested that productivity growth in the services 
sector was much lower than in the rest of the economy, and services output prices tended to 
increase more rapidly. This is also known as the cost disease of services (Baumol, 1967). 
Kaldor’s most notable finding was the stability of the share of labour in GDP over time. 
These stylised facts have been a crucial ingredient in much subsequent work on economic 
growth, development economics, international macroeconomics and trade, business cycles 
and labour markets.1 The purpose of this paper is to examine whether these stylised facts 
provide an accurate description of more recent structural changes.  
To establish a new set of stylised facts we rely on a new data source, the EU KLEMS 
database, containing detailed measures of output, labour and capital inputs (O’Mahony and 
Timmer, 2009). This greatly facilitates tracking of sectoral trends in GDP, employment, 
prices, input shares and multifactor productivity. We search for similarities in long-run 
growth patterns since 1980 across three major regions – Europe, Japan, and the U.S. These 
regions include a very large part of the OECD and the world economy. When considering 
sectoral developments in Europe, it is important to aggregate across European countries. 
Specialisation may generate differences in country patterns as relatively small countries trade 
widely. Therefore, we study developments in the European Union as a whole, rather than 
individual European countries, as in Kaldor (1963), Kuznets (1971) and Maddison (1980).  
                                                 
1
 For example, sectoral differences in productivity are an important cornerstone in models of real 
exchange rates (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). They also underpin the hypothesis of cost disease of the 
services sector described by Baumol (1967) and motivate the recent surge in multi-sector endogenous 
growth models, e.g. Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). 
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  We find that the analysis of structural change requires a radical shift of emphasis 
from goods production to the production of services. The division of the economy among 
agriculture, industry and services has lost most of its relevance. The agricultural sector has 
become small, while services now comprise about three-quarters of GDP. And our 
disaggregated industry analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity within the services sector. 
Personal, finance and business services follow the classical pattern of low productivity 
growth, rising relative prices and increasing shares in employment and GDP. The shares of 
non-market services in GDP and employment have also continued to rise. On the other hand, 
the shares of distribution services have been stable, and productivity growth has been rapid. 
Contrary to Kaldor’s finding, we find that the labour share in value added has been declining 
in all sectors and regions over the period 1980-2005, except in U.S. finance and business 
services. Finally, the use of ICT capital and skilled labour is increasing in all sectors, in 
particular in the services industries.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II we describe our data 
sources. Section III is devoted to changes in industry shares in GDP and employment. In 
Section IV, we discuss trends in productivity, as well as in output prices. We study patterns in 
the use of labour and capital, in particular skilled labour and ICT capital, in Section V. 
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Data Sources 
The data for this study are taken from the EU KLEMS database, March 2008 version 
(available at www.euklems.net). The Japanese data in EU KLEMS are based on the Japan 
Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database Project (Fukao, et al., 2007) and data for the U.S. are 
based on Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005). The data for the European Union covers ten major 
European countries for which capital input data are available by industry: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.2 
Output and inputs have been aggregated across European countries by means of relative 
                                                 
2
 This group of countries is called EU15ex in the EU KLEMS database. 
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prices of output (PPPs) which are industry-specific. The EU KLEMS database has been 
constructed largely on the basis of data from national statistical institutes and processed 
according to harmonised procedures. These procedures ensure international comparability 
and generate growth accounts in a consistent and uniform way. Data are available from 1980 
onwards and for some countries back to 1970.3 O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) provide a 
detailed description of the contents and construction of the EU KLEMS database, so that we 
can be brief.  
Nominal and real series for output and value added at the industry level are taken 
directly from the national accounts. The most important innovation in the EU KLEMS 
database is that estimates of multifactor productivity incorporate detailed measures of labour 
and capital services.4 Labour input is based on hours worked, weighted by wages of various 
types of labour, cross-classified into 18 categories by educational attainment, gender, and 
age. Imputations for the labour compensation of self-employed are made by assuming that the 
compensation per hour of the self-employed is equal to the compensation per hour of 
employees with similar characteristics. Capital input is defined in terms of capital services 
rather than capital stocks. Capital stocks, cross-classified by eight categories of assets are 
weighted by rental prices rather than asset prices.5 The rental prices of each asset consist of a 
nominal, ex-post rate of return, depreciation, and capital gains. The nominal rate of return 
exhausts capital income and is consistent with constant returns to scale. For each type of asset 
stocks have been estimated on the basis of investment series using the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM) with geometric depreciation profiles.  
To analyse broad changes in the economy, we have aggregated the 31 industries in 
the EU KLEMS database to a smaller set of sectors. These sectors are representative of the 
heterogeneity in patterns of growth and structural change. In addition, we distinguish the 
                                                 
3
 For historical analysis back to 1950 and an extension to non-OECD countries, see the GGDC 10-
sector database at www.ggdc.net. 
4
 A short history of growth accounting is presented by Jorgenson (2009).  
5
 These assets are residential structures, non-residential structures, transport equipment, information 
technology equipment, communication technology equipment, other machinery and equipment, 
software and other fixed capital assets. 
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ICT-producing sector which has played a critical role in recent U.S. economic growth 
(Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 2005). For this purpose we focus on seven sectors: ELECOM 
(ICT-production), MexELEC (manufacturing excluding ICT-production), OtherG (other 
goods production including agriculture, construction, mining and utilities), DISTR 
(distribution services), FINBU (finance and business services) and PERS (personal services) 
and NONMAR (non-market services, including public administration, education, health and 
real estate).6 Table 1 provides the precise definition of each group in terms of the NACE rev 
1 industry classification scheme.  
 
III. Sector Shares of GDP and Employment  
The shift from agriculture to industry, featured prominently in the earlier literature on 
modern growth, is still an important characteristic of growth in emerging countries (Temple, 
2005). Currently, agriculture typically employs six percent or less of the labour force in the 
EU, Japan and the U.S., so that the shift from industry to services characterizes the process of 
structural change since the 1970s. In Figure 1a we show the ratio of value added in services 
(including market and non-market services) to goods production over the period from 1980 to 
2005. In all regions, the importance of services has steadily increased. A similar trend is 
found for hours worked (Figure 1b). While this confirms the first Kuznets-Maddison fact,7 
these figures show that services totally dominate value added and hours worked in advanced 
economies with at least double the output and hours worked of goods production in the EU 
and Japan and more than triple in the U.S. 
Table 2 presents value added by our seven sectors as a percentage of GDP in 1980 
and 2005 for each region, and similarly for hours worked in Table 3. This more disaggregated 
                                                 
6
 In EU KLEMS as elsewhere we refer to these sectors as ‘non-market services’, recognising that some 
output of these sectors is provided by the private sector and the extent of this varies across countries.  
Non-market services should not be confounded with household production or home services. We rely 
on data collected within national accounts that exclude household activities. Real estate is grouped in 
non-market services as for the most part the output of the real estate sector is imputed rent on owner-
occupied dwellings. Input in this sector consists mainly of residential buildings and meaningful 
(labour) productivity estimates cannot be made.  
7
 Ngai and Pissarides (2007) provide a model that explains these sectoral shifts as a country grows 
richer. They stress the importance of differences in technology across sectors, rather than non-
homothetic tastes, as the driving force of structural change. 
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view reveals striking differences among the four service industries. In 1980 non-market 
services already had the highest shares in output and employment in all regions and these 
increased slowly through 2005. Personal services also increased their shares in the overall 
economy; their share in employment is about double the share of value added in GDP. The 
biggest increase in shares is in finance and business services, both in value added and 
employment. By contrast to these three services industries, shares of the distribution sector 
remained constant or slightly declined.  
The increase in the shares of services came at the expense of traditional goods 
production. Shares of manufacturing and other goods production declined rapidly in all 
regions. In 2005 manufacturing accounted for around 15%, while other goods accounted only 
for about 10% of GDP. Declines in employment were equally strong. The production of ICT 
goods and services makes up only a minor part of GDP and this share has been slightly 
declining in the EU and U.S. The decline is particular strong in hours worked. Despite the 
low shares, the contribution of this sector to aggregate productivity growth is high due to 
rapid productivity growth, as discussed in the next section. 
The shares of the various sectors across the three regions display a remarkable 
similarity in 2005, especially if one accounts for differences in international trade patterns 
such as a higher share of manufacturing exports in Japan.8 The most surprising difference is 
to be found in the employment share of non-market services, which is much higher in the 
U.S. than in the EU or Japan. The gap in the employment share of services between the EU 
and U.S. has often been highlighted as an “anomaly” (Rogerson, 2008, and Pissarides, 2007). 
Explanations for this anomaly should focus on the non-market services sector, rather than 
market services, since the share of market services is essentially identical in the EU, Japan 
and the U.S. By 2005 transatlantic differences in the share of services employment are mainly 
in non-market services, such as health and education.  
 
                                                 
8
 See Redding et al. (2008) for an analysis of the difference in the timing of de-industrialisation across 
the OECD. 
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IV. Productivity Growth and Relative Prices Trends 
 In the previous section we have demonstrated that developments in the sector shares 
in GDP and employment are more or less the same in the EU, Japan and U.S. Services have 
become predominant in all three regions. At the same time we have found considerable 
heterogeneity among the different services sub-sectors, almost totally ignored in the previous 
literature. One of the other empirical regularities documented by Kuznets and Maddison is 
the slow growth of labour productivity in services compared to industry. Traditionally, 
manufacturing activities have been regarded as the locus of innovation and technological 
change and thus the central source of economic growth. This was originally the key to post-
World War II growth in Europe and Japan through realisation of economies of scale, capital 
intensification, and incremental innovation.  
More recently, rapid technological change in computer and semiconductor 
manufacturing has seemingly reinforced the pre-dominance of innovation in the 
manufacturing sector. By contrast, the services sector was believed to be characterised by 
limited scope for innovation and technical change with productivity growth rates that are 
much lower than in industry. This was prominently featured in Baumol’s analysis of the cost 
disease of services (Baumol, 1967).9 In this section we will study sectoral trends in 
productivity and prices since 1980. Due to a lack of data on capital inputs, Kuznets and 
Maddison focused only on trends in labour productivity. Here we will focus also on 
multifactor productivity (MFP), which measures the efficiency with which all inputs are 
being used, rather than labour alone.  
To calculate MFP we rely on the neoclassical production theory framework 
motivated by the seminal contributions of Solow (1957) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). 
This is based on production possibility frontiers where industry value added is a function of 
                                                 
9
 In fact, Baumol made a careful distinction between progressive and stagnant industries and explicitly 
stated that some services industries can be progressive as well. This subtlety was often lost in 
subsequent discussions. See Baumol, Blackman and Wolf (1985) and Nordhaus (2008) for a more 
recent analyses based on detailed U.S. data. 
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capital, labour, and technology, which is indexed by time, T.10 Each industry, indexed by j, 
can produce a set of products and purchases a number of distinct capital and labour inputs to 
produce its output. The production function is given by:  
( )TLKfY jjjj ,,=   (1) 
where Y is value added, K is an index of capital service flows and L is an index of labour 
service flows. We assume a flexible trans-log production frontier for each sector. Under the 
assumptions of competitive factor markets, full input utilization and constant returns to scale, 
the growth of output can be expressed as the (cost share) weighted growth of inputs and a 
residual measure called multifactor productivity (MFP).11 MFP growth (denoted by jtAln∆ ) 





jtjtjt LvKvYA lnlnlnln ∆−∆−∆≡∆   (2) 
where iv denotes the two-period average share of input i in nominal value added and Lv  and 
Kv  add to one. Under the neo-classical assumptions, MFP is an indicator of disembodied 
technological change.  
An important innovation in the EU KLEMS database is that we define each of the 










jtkjt KwK ,, lnln   (4)   
where tlL ,ln∆ indicates the growth of hours worked by labour type l and weights are given 
by the period average shares of each type in the value of labour compensation, and similarly 
                                                 
10
 More generally, one should model gross output as a function of capital, labour, intermediate inputs 
and technology. As yet, the EU KLEMS database does not contain measures of output that account for 
intra-industry deliveries. In our restrictive value-added model, we rely on the assumption that 
production is separable in capital, labour and technology (see Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni, 1987). 
11
 A is also known as total factor productivity. But as the current measure indicates the productivity of 
only two inputs (capital and labour) we prefer to call it multi-factor productivity.   
12
 Aggregate input is unobservable and it is common to express it as a translog function of its 
individual components. This allows for different and non-constant substitution elasticities between the 
detailed input types. Then the corresponding index is a Törnqvist volume index (see Jorgenson, Gollop 
and Fraumeni, 1987, for further discussion).  
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for K. As we assume that marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs, the weighting 
procedure ensures that inputs that have a higher price also get a bigger influence in the input 
index. For example, a doubling of hours worked by a high-skilled worker gets a bigger 
weight than a doubling of hours worked by a low-skilled worker.  
In our analysis of productivity we exclude the non-market services industries as 
productivity growth in these industries is not well-measured in the national accounts. 
Typically, growth of real output is proxied by the growth of inputs, such as number of 
employees, often with an arbitrary productivity adjustment. Recently, there has been a move 
within the statistical community to employ output quantity indicators to measure volumes of 
output. Until this process is more advanced, productivity measures for non-market services 
should be interpreted with care, if at all.13    
In Figure 2 we present trends in productivity for the EU, Japan and U.S. over the 
period 1980-2005. This gives the ratio of productivity in market services over goods 
production, indexed to unity in 1980. For labour productivity (Figure 2a) it is clear that the 
trend identified by Kuznets and Maddison continued into the 1980s as the ratio declined in all 
regions. However, this trend stopped in Japan and the U.S. around 1990. Labour productivity 
growth in goods production was no longer higher than in market services, and even lagged 
behind in some sub-periods. This pattern also emerges for multifactor productivity (Figure 
2b). The EU KLEMS database makes it possible to take into account changes in the 
composition of the labour force and in the use of capital services, so that multifactor 
productivity is a proxy for technical change. On the basis of Figure 2 we conclude that the 
stylized fact of higher productivity growth in goods production is no longer accurate for 
Japan and the U.S. For the European Union labour productivity in goods production kept 
increasing in the 1990s, while productivity growth in market services was lack-lustre.14   
                                                 
13
 See e.g. commentary by Lengellé on Maddison (1980) for an early statement of this problem, and 
Atkinson (2005) for a recent extensive discussion. 
14
 Inklaar, Timmer and van Ark (2008) provide an in-depth discussion of the role of market services in 
an explanation of differences in growth in the U.S. and across Europe since the 1990s. 
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In addition, the sectors we consider are highly diverse in terms of their labour 
productivity performance, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 4. Table 4 provides average annual 
growth rates for the period 1980-2005 and Figure 3 presents trends with 1980 indexed to 100. 
By far the fastest growth in labour productivity is found in ICT production with annual 
average growth rates of 3% in the EU to more than 5% in Japan and the U.S.15 The second-
fastest growth in Japan and the U.S. has been in distribution services, more than doubling its 
labour productivity level since 1980. In fact, growth in this sector has been higher than in 
manufacturing.16 On the other hand, labour productivity growth in other services industries 
has been very low. Finance and business services and personal services rank at the bottom in 
all regions during the entire period. The wide range in sectoral labour productivity growth 
rates is a striking development. With Cobb-Douglas technologies and homogeneous labour, 
labour productivity would grow at a similar rate in all sectors.17 This suggests that sectors 
differ substantially in their production technologies: elasticities of substitution between 
labour and capital may not be one and/or the skill composition of the labour force differs 
across sectors and over time, as we show in Section V below.  
Figure 4 and Table 5 show the cross-section variation in the rates of MFP growth, 
indexed to 100 in 1980 as before. Given the fact that all sectors have increased their use of 
skilled labour and of capital services (see next section), productivity growth of hours worked 
is higher than multifactor productivity growth. In some cases, the difference is huge. For 
example, in Japanese manufacturing average labour productivity growth was 3.3%. Taking 
into account the large increase in use of skilled labour and capital, productivity growth 
dropped to 0.6%. Multifactor productivity growth is by far the highest in ICT production, 
manufacturing and distribution services and slowest in finance and business services and 
personal services.18  
                                                 
15
 The trend for this sector is not shown in Figure 3 as it would dwarf all other curves. 
16
 Interestingly Baumol (1967) highlights the retail trade sector as a prominent example of a stagnant 
sector, and expected the share of trade industries in employment to rise. 
17
 Assuming labour can move freely across sectors and is paid its marginal product, see Temple (2005). 
18
 MFP growth is sometimes even negative. This might seem improbable as, under strict neoclassical 
assumptions, this would indicate technological regress. However, in practice measured MFP includes a 
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In Table 6 we provide the contributions of industries to market economy productivity 
growth over the period 1980-2005. We follow the method of Stiroh (2002) and calculate the 
contribution of a sector to aggregate labour-productivity growth as the sectoral labour-
productivity growth rate, weighted by its period-average share in aggregate value added.19 
Productivity growth rates are by far the highest in ICT production, but the contribution of this 
sector to aggregate growth is limited by its small share in overall value added. Manufacturing 
and other goods-producing industries have remained dominant in the EU, while the 
contribution of market services has been higher in Japan and the U.S. In particular, the 
contribution of distribution services stands out as productivity growth has been rapid and this 
sector commands a sizeable share of the economy.20   
Differences in productivity growth across sectors drive developments in relative 
prices. In a recent analysis based on detailed U.S. industry data, Nordhaus (2008) finds strong 
evidence that high productivity growth in a sector is passed on to the buyers of their products 
in the form of lower prices. Technology shifts dominate shifts in demand or in mark-ups. In 
Figure 5 and Table 7 we provide the growth rates of output prices for our set of seven sectors 
for the EU, Japan and the U.S. Since rates of inflation differ, we subtract total economy price 
growth from the sectoral growth rates of output prices. We find that the development of the 
output price of a sector is rather similar across the three regions and is inversely related to 
productivity growth. Industries with low productivity growth such as finance and business 
services show relative high growth in output prices. By contrast relative prices for ICT 
production, manufacturing and distribution services grew only slowly, while productivity 
growth was high.  
                                                                                                                                           
range of other effects including any deviations from the assumption that marginal costs reflect 
marginal revenues, changes in unmeasured inputs, such as intangible investments, and measurement 
errors in inputs and outputs. Clearly, MFP growth, especially in services sectors, should be interpreted 
with care (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009). 
19
 The reallocation term is calculated as the difference between weighted and aggregate growth. It is 
positive when output is shifted towards sectors with higher labour productivity levels. 
20
 See Triplett and Bosworth (2006) for an early study of the role of market services in the recent 
acceleration of U.S. productivity growth. 
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Our analysis of structural change identifies important new stylized facts about the 
economies in advanced nations during the past quarter century. Productivity growth in goods 
production has continued, especially in ICT production, accompanied by a decline in relative 
prices and shares in output and employment. On the other hand, finance and business services 
and personal services remain stagnant sectors with low or no productivity improvements, 
increasing prices and increasing shares in employment. However, distribution services have 
been very dynamic with rapid productivity growth and a basically constant employment 
share. This is a radical change in perspective from the stylized facts of Kaldor, Kuznets, and 
Maddison, emphasizing the trichotomy of agriculture, manufacturing, and services. The detail 
available from the EU KLEMS database provides a distinctive and more sharply focused 
view of the forces driving the recent growth of the world’s advanced economies.  
 
V. Factor Shares and Use of ICT and Skilled Labour  
Structural change not only entails the changes in output and productivity analysed by 
Kuznets and Maddison, but also shifts in the mix of inputs used in the production process. 
Kaldor’s most influential fact is the stability of the labour share in GDP over time (Kaldor, 
1963). This finding was based on historical evidence on U.S. and U.K. growth.21 More 
recently, Blanchard (1997) found that although the labour share continued to be stable in the 
U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries, it tended to decrease in continental Europe over the 
period 1980-1995. He linked this difference to a stronger substitution process of labour with 
capital in Europe.22  
In the spirit of Kaldor, we study changes in the structure of production technologies 
that appear in the factor shares in value added, not only for aggregate labour and capital 
inputs but also for a more detailed breakdown of inputs. Recent evidence suggests that 
technical change has favoured inputs that are well suited to the generation, processing, and 
diffusion of knowledge and information, namely skilled labour and information and 
                                                 
21
 See Gollin (2002) for more evidence across a large set of countries. 
22
 See also Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). 
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communication technology (ICT) capital. For the U.S., Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) have 
documented large increases in the use of both skilled labour and ICT capital across the 
economy. They also found substantial variation in the use of these inputs across individual 
industries. In this section we track the use of skilled labour and ICT-capital in major sectors 
in Europe, Japan and the U.S. to discover common patterns in the knowledge intensification 
of production. 
In this paper we use the cost measures of inputs rather than the more frequently used 
quantity measures. The differences between these measures will be explained below. Input 
measures based on the cost approach start from the standard national accounting identity that 
value added equals the compensation for labour and capital. We will distinguish between two 
groups of labour (skilled SL and unskilled UL) and two types of capital (ICT assets KIT and 
non-ICT assets KNIT). Let P and Q denote prices and quantities respectively, indexed for 
value added and various inputs, then  
  
KNITKNITKITKITULULSLSLVAVA QPQPQPQPQP +++=  (5) 
 
Using identity (6), we will look at three cost-shares as indicators, namely the labour-
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An increase in the cost shares indicates the increasing importance of an input in 
production. Note that the increase can be due to an increase in the price of the input or due to 
an increase in the quantity used, relative to the other inputs. These indicators are different 
from simpler measures that are often used, such as the share of high-skilled workers in total 
employment ( )ULSLSL QQQ + . This indicator is based on quantities alone and ignores 
price changes. Suppose that the marginal productivity of skilled labour increases more than 
that of unskilled labour due to skill-biased technological change. Under the standard 
assumption that differences in marginal productivity are reflected in relative prices, this is 
picked up in the cost share (7), but not in the share of high-skilled workers.  
Another common alternative indicator is the share of high-skilled workers in total 
labour compensation: ( )ULULSLSLSLSL QPQPQP + . This indicator corrects for differences 
in productivity between various types of labour, but does not take into account other inputs. 
For example, if labour (both skilled and unskilled) is substituted with capital, the share of 
high-skilled workers in labour compensation can increase while their importance in 
production actually declines. The cost share indicator defined in (7) takes account of 
substitution effects among labour types and between labour and other inputs. 
The empirical implementation of (7) is relatively straightforward as the hours worked 
by skilled labour and their relative wages can be directly taken from the EU KLEMS 
database. We multiply total labour compensation of all workers (variable LAB in the 
database) with the share of high-skilled workers in total labour compensation (LABHS) and 
divided by nominal value added (VA). Labour compensation includes an imputation for self-
employed workers. High-skilled workers are defined as workers with college education and 
above.  
Measuring the ICT-capital intensity of production is less straightforward as quantities 
and prices of capital services are not directly observable. Simpler measures are often used 
such as the number of computers per employee, or the share of ICT-assets in total investment 
or capital stock. Our measure of the relative importance of ICT is based on the concept of 
  15 
capital services introduced by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). In this approach, capital input 
is measured through its delivery of services in a specific period (in this case year) as 
measured by its user cost.  
The user-cost approach is crucial because the annual amount of capital services 
delivered per euro of investment in ICT is much higher than that of an euro invested in, say, 
buildings. An ICT asset may typically be scrapped after 5 years while buildings may provide 
services for decades. In addition, asset prices for ICT equipment are falling rapidly. As a 
result, the user cost of ICT machinery is typically 50 to 60 percent of the asset price, while 
that of buildings is less than 10 percent. This is picked up by the rental price of capital 
services, Ktkp , , which reflects the price at which the investor is indifferent between buying or 
renting the capital good k for a one-year lease in the rental market. In the absence of taxation 
the equilibrium condition can be rearranged, yielding the familiar cost-of-capital equation: 
][ 1,,,1,, I tkI tkI tkktI tkKtk ppprpp −− −−+= δ
  (9) 
with tr  representing the nominal rate of return, kδ  the depreciation rate of asset type k, and 
I
tkp , , the investment price of asset type k. This formula shows that the rental fee is 
determined by the nominal rate of return, the rate of economic depreciation and the asset-
specific capital gains. In the EU KLEMS database, the nominal rate of return is determined 
ex-post. It is assumed that the total value of capital services for each industry equals its 
compensation for all assets. This procedure yields an internal rate of return that exhausts 
capital income and is consistent with the accounting identity (5).23 In the EU KLEMS 
database ICT assets include information technology assets, communication technology assets, 
and software. ICT intensity is measured by multiplying capital compensation (variable CAP 
in the database) with the share of ICT assets in total capital compensation (CAPIT), divided 
by nominal value added (VA). 
                                                 
23
 An alternative (exogenous) approach would allow for profits that are not part of capital 
compensation, see e.g. Oulton (2007). 
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Table 8 and Figure 6 provide trends in the share of labour in value added over the 
period 1980-2005, based on equation (6). In the EU the long-run trend of substituting labour 
with capital, described by Blanchard (1997), continued until the middle 1990s, but has 
tapered off since then. The overall labour share dropped from 72% in 1980 to 66% in 2005, 
and a similar declining trend can be found in all sectors. In Japan labour shares continued to 
drop over this period from 63% to 54%. In the U.S. the overall labour share declined from 
67% in 1980 to 63% in 2005, in particular in manufacturing and ICT production. We 
conclude that the labour share has not been constant since 1980. Instead there has been a 
general decline in the labour share in all sectors (except US finance and business services). 
This decline was 5 to 10 percentage points in many sectors and most of it occurred in the 
period 1980-1995. 
In Figure 7 and Table 9 we provide the wage bill of high-skilled workers as a share of 
value added for each industry. The patterns are strikingly similar across industries and across 
regions. The importance of high-skilled labour has gradually but steadily increased over the 
past decades. And the rate of increase is roughly constant across all sectors in a region. This 
holds, even when looking at detailed market services and goods industries.24 This confirms 
the long-term trends documented in Berman et al. (1998) for manufacturing in the OECD, 
and in Jorgenson et al. (2005) for all industries in the U.S. Skill-upgrading of the economy is 
not primarily due to strong growth in a limited number of sectors, but rather reflects an 
economy-wide trend. Nevertheless, there are large differences between industries in the use 
of high-skilled labour. By far the most skill-intensive industry in the EU, Japan and the U.S. 
is finance and business services. In all regions, manufacturing and other goods production are 
among the least skill-intensive industries. This ordering of industries is remarkable constant 
over time and points at persistent differences in structures of production. 
 
                                                 
24
 Figure 7 should not be interpreted as evidence for the low skill-level of the labour force in the EU, 
compared to Japan and the U.S. As comparability of educational attainment and qualifications across 
countries is still problematical, cross-country comparisons of skill shares should be interpreted with 
care.  
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In Figure 8 and Table 10, the shares of ICT-capital compensation in value added are 
given for the EU, Japan and the U.S. Like skill intensity, ICT intensity is increasing over time 
in all sectors and regions. Typically, ICT intensity of production has doubled or even tripled 
over the period from 1980 to 2005. This increase had already started in the 1980s, but has 
paused with the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. The rapid increase in the share of 
ICT in value added can be attributed to strong substitution with ICT induced by the rapid 
decline in its price relative to non-ICT assets and labour (Jorgenson, 2001). Figure 8 shows 
that the ordering of sectors in terms of their ICT-intensity is rather similar across regions. ICT 
production and finance and business services are the most intensive users of ICT, while 
goods production and personal services are least ICT-intensive. Distribution services was one 
of the least ICT-intensive sectors, but has had one of the highest growth rates. Finally, there 
is a strong correlation between the use of skilled labour and ICT at the sectoral level, 
suggesting the need for further research on the interrelationships among skills, capital and 
technology.25 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have reconsidered the stylised facts put forward by Kaldor (1967), 
Kuznets (1971) and Maddison (1980), using new data on patterns of economic growth in the 
European Union, Japan and the U.S. since 1980 provided by the EU KLEMS data base. We 
conclude that the classical trichotomy among agriculture, manufacturing, and services has 
lost most of its relevance. Services now account for about three-quarters of value added and 
hours worked, and productivity growth in market services predominates over productivity 
growth in goods production in Japan and the U.S., although not in Europe.26  
We have also discovered enormous heterogeneity among different services sub-sectors, 
largely ignored in the previous literature. Distribution services have rapid productivity growth 
                                                 
25
 Much of this work has been based on aggregate trends or manufacturing industries only, see e.g. 
Machin and van Reenen (1998), Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998) and Berman, Bound and Machin 
(1998). 
26
 Timmer et al. (2010) provides an analysis of European growth trends. 
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rates and declining relative prices, while their shares in GDP and employment are more or 
less constant. Clearly, this sector has become a major engine of aggregate productivity 
growth in all regions. However, finance and business services still have the symptoms of 
Baumol’s (1967) cost disease, as do personal services. These industries suffer from low 
productivity growth, increasing output prices and growing shares in employment and GDP. 
Non-market services have increased shares in output and employment as well, but little can 
be said about the productivity performance of this sector due to unresolved measurement 
issues.  
 We also find that the labour share in value added is declining, contrary to Kaldor’s 
most notable stylised fact. This decline is pervasive in all sectors and regions, except in U.S. 
finance and business services. In addition, we have discovered important trends in the more 
detailed measures of inputs now available from the EU KLEMS database. We have 
demonstrated that the shares of skilled labour compensation and ICT in value added have 
increased substantially in all sectors. Nevertheless there are large differences among 
industries. In all regions, manufacturing and other goods production are among the least skill- 
and ICT-intensive industries. On the other hand use of these inputs is high in distribution 
services and in particular finance and business services. This ordering of industries is 
remarkable constant over time and points to persistent sectoral differences in structures of 
production. More generally, our findings suggest that the treatment of the services sector as a 
homogenous and stagnant sector in contrast to dynamic manufacturing is completely 
unwarranted.  
These findings call for a greater attention to individual services sectors to understand the 
process of economic growth and structural change. This will open up a broad spectrum of 
research, ranging from empirical to more conceptual issues. For example, there is an urgent 
need for improved measurement of non-market services and finance.27 And while much is 
known about the drivers of technical change in manufacturing, much less is known about 
                                                 
27
 Triplett and Bosworth (2004). 
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innovation in services.28 Arguably, “soft” innovations in services with a greater emphasis on 
human resources, organizational change, and other intangible investments strongly specific to 
the firm are likely to be more difficult to imitate than “hard” technologies embodied in 
industrial equipment in manufacturing. This call for more research on services is certainly not 
new, but we have presented new evidence that underlines its importance.29  
In addition, our findings also have a number of implications for theoretical and empirical 
work currently relying on the Kaldor-Kuznets-Maddison set of stylised facts. Recent multi-
sector endogenous growth models have focused mainly on the shift from agriculture to 
industry or from industry to services. Given the large differences in technical progress and 
input structures within the services industries, reliance on an aggregate representation of the 
services sector is tenuous at best (see also Temple, 2005). Furthermore, greater attention must 
be given to how investments in ICT goods and services serve as a vehicle for technology 
diffusion (Vourvachaki, 2009). A more refined treatment of services will also allow a more 
precise analysis of models featuring household production (as in Pissarides, 2007; Rogerson, 
2008). While household activities may substitute for certain services activities such as 
housekeeping, cooking and care-giving, this is much less appropriate for business services or 
public administration. Lastly, the simultaneous increase in the use of skills and ICT in all 
sectors is strongly suggestive of pervasive capital-skill complementarities.30 This highlights 
new possibilities for investigating the links among investment, education, and technical 
change, based on the international evidence at a detailed industry level provided by the EU 
KLEMS database.   
 
                                                 
28
 An excellent survey of innovation, especially in services, is presented by Brynjolfsson and Saunders 
(2009).  
29
 Fuchs (1968) is an early example, see also Griliches (1992) and Triplett and Bosworth (2004). 
Broadberry (2006) provides a re-appraisal of the role of services in historical growth episodes.  
30
 See Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) for an overview. 
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Figure 1  Ratio of services and goods production 
























Source: Ratio of variable in services (market and non-market) over goods production. Based on EU 
KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Figure 2  Ratio of productivity in market services and goods production 





























Source: Ratio of productivity in market services over goods production, 1980 is set to one. 3-year 
moving averages. Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Figure 3  Real value added per hour worked (1980=100) 

































































Source: Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Figure 4 Multi-factor productivity (1980=100) 






































































Source: Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
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Figure 5  Output prices (1980=100) 



































































Source: Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).  
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Figure 6  Compensation of workers as share of value added 

































































































Source: Share of labour compensation in gross value added, 3-year moving average. Based on EU 
KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Figure 7  Compensation of high-skilled workers as share of value added  






































































































Source: Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Figure 8  Compensation of ICT-capital as share of value added  



































































































Source: Based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
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Table 1   Description of sectors 
Description Abbre-
viation 
NACE rev. 1 -code 
ICT-PRODUCTION  
(incl. electrical machinery manufacturing & post 
and communication services) 
ELECOM 30-33 and 64 
MANUFACTURING  
(excl. electrical machinery) 
MexElec 15-29 and 34-37 
OTHER PRODUCTION  
(incl. agriculture, mining, utilities and construction) 
OtherG A-C and E-F 
DISTRIBUTION 
 (incl. trade and transportation) 
DISTR 50-52 and 60-63 
FINANCE AND BUSINESS SERVICES  
(excl. Real estate) 
FINBU J and 71-74 
PERSONAL SERVICES  
(incl. hotels, restaurants, community, social and 
personal services) 
PERS H, O and P 
NON-MARKET SERVICES  
(incl. public administration, education, health and 
real estate) 
NONMAR 70 and L-N 
GOODS PRODUCTION  
 
ELECOM+ MexElec+OtherG 
MARKET SERVICES  
 
DISTR + FINBU + PERS 
SERVICES  NONMAR +MARKET SERVICES 
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Table 2   Gross value added by sector as a percentage of GDP  
1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
…ICT PRODUCTION 4.9 4.6 6.1 4.7 5.2 5.7
...GOODS 36.1 25.9 31.5 22.0 40.2 26.8
......Manufacturing 21.1 15.7 19.2 12.0 24.6 17.2
......Other goods 14.9 10.2 12.4 10.1 15.5 9.7
...SERVICES 59.0 69.5 62.4 73.3 54.7 67.5
......Market services 30.6 39.3 32.9 40.2 34.8 40.0
.........Distribution 15.6 15.1 16.9 14.5 18.7 18.1
.........Finance & Business 10.3 17.7 11.2 19.5 9.2 14.4
.........Personal 4.7 6.5 4.8 6.3 6.9 7.6
......Non-market services 28.4 30.2 29.5 33.1 19.9 27.5
EU US Japan
 
Source: Calculations based on EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, see O’Mahony and Timmer 
(2009). For sector definitions, see Table 1. 
 
Table 3   Hours worked by sector as a percentage of total hours worked  
1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
…ICT PRODUCTION 4.4 3.1 5.1 3.3 4.0 4.0
...GOODS 43.5 27.3 29.4 20.8 43.5 31.5
......Manufacturing 23.2 14.4 18.8 10.9 20.2 15.7
......Other goods 20.2 12.9 10.6 9.9 23.4 15.8
...SERVICES 52.1 69.6 65.4 75.9 52.4 64.5
......Market services 34.4 47.7 40.3 47.3 41.7 48.5
.........Distribution 19.7 20.2 20.4 19.3 23.9 21.3
.........Finance & Business 7.3 15.6 10.5 16.8 6.3 12.6
.........Personal 7.3 11.9 9.4 11.2 11.4 14.6
......Non-market services 17.7 21.9 25.2 28.7 10.8 16.0
EU US Japan
 
Source: see Table 2. 
 
 
  34 




TOTAL 1.9 1.7 3.2
…ICT PRODUCTION 5.5 7.5 10.0
...GOODS 2.7 1.8 3.0
......Manufacturing 2.7 2.4 3.3
......Other goods 2.7 0.9 2.3
...SERVICES 1.2 1.4 2.6
......Market services 1.3 2.1 2.9
.........Distribution 2.2 3.2 3.5
.........Finance & Business 0.3 0.9 2.7
.........Personal -0.4 1.2 0.7
......Non-market services 1.0 0.1 1.4
 




Table 5   Multi-factor productivity (average annual compound growth rates) 
EU US Japan
TOTAL 0.6 0.4 0.7
…ICT PRODUCTION 3.2 5.0 6.4
...GOODS 1.2 0.7 0.3
......Manufacturing 1.3 1.0 0.6
......Other goods 1.1 0.4 -0.2
...SERVICES 0.1 -0.1 0.3
......Market services 0.0 0.5 0.9
.........Distribution 1.1 2.2 2.2
.........Finance & Business -0.9 -1.4 0.3
.........Personal -1.0 0.7 -1.3
......Non-market services 0.3 -0.8 -0.7
 
Source: MFP is on value-added basis, see Table 2. 
  35 
 
Table 6 Sectoral contributions to aggregate labour-productivity growth (%-points), 1980-2005 
EU US Jap
MARKET ECONOMY 2.1 2.3 3.5
of which
ICT Production 0.4 0.6 0.7
Manufacturing 0.7 0.5 0.9
Other goods 0.5 0.2 0.4
Distribution 0.5 0.7 0.9
Finance & Business 0.1 0.2 0.4
Personal 0.0 0.1 0.1
Reallocation effect 0.1 0.0 0.2
 
Note: Contribution of a sector to aggregate labour-productivity growth is calculated as the sectoral labour-
productivity growth weighted by its period-average share in aggregate value added. The reallocation term is 
calculated as the difference between weighted and aggregate growth. Figures may not add due to rounding. 
Source: see Table 2. 
 
 
Table 7   Output prices (average annual compound growth rates), 1980-2005 
EU US Japan
TOTAL 0.0 0.0 0.0
…ICT PRODUCTION -1.8 -3.6 -2.9
...GOODS -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
......Manufacturing 0.0 -0.4 -0.3
......Other goods -0.4 0.2 0.4
...SERVICES 0.3 0.6 0.7
......Market services 0.3 0.0 0.4
.........Distribution -0.2 -1.0 0.2
.........Finance & Business 0.6 0.8 -0.1
.........Personal 1.1 0.7 1.4
......Non-market services 0.2 1.4 1.2
 
Note: growth in gross output price in sector minus relative to total economy price change. 
Source:  see Table 2. 
 
 
  36 
Table 8   Compensation of all workers as share of value added  (%) 
1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005
TOTAL 72.1 66.2 66.8 63.2 62.7 53.5
…ICT PRODUCTION 69.8 61.0 77.5 62.6 59.1 44.4
...GOODS 73.4 68.2 68.9 58.6 61.3 57.4
......Manufacturing 74.0 70.6 75.5 61.1 55.6 52.1
......Other goods 72.6 64.5 58.7 55.6 70.4 66.8
...SERVICES 71.5 65.7 64.6 64.7 64.0 52.7
......Market services 77.9 71.5 72.3 71.9 72.2 62.9
.........Distribution 83.9 74.4 75.8 73.5 77.1 62.5
.........Finance & Business 67.1 66.9 63.6 69.5 61.3 58.7
.........Personal 82.0 77.5 80.0 75.9 73.3 71.8
......Non-market services 64.7 58.2 56.1 55.9 49.7 37.8
EU US Japan
 
Note: Labour compensation as a percentage of value added, including employees and self-employed 
persons, see equation (6). 
Source: see Table 2. 
 
 
Table 9   Compensation of high-skilled workers as share of value added  (%) 
1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005
TOTAL 8.3     16.0   18.5   30.4   12.8   19.9   
…ICT PRODUCTION 3.8     11.7   20.0   34.0   9.2     15.6   
...GOODS 3.3     8.5     11.5   17.7   9.1     15.2   
......Manufacturing 3.8     10.1   13.5   22.2   7.8     13.0   
......Other goods 2.5     6.0     8.6     11.8   11.3   19.2   
...SERVICES 11.2   19.0   22.2   34.1   15.8   22.1   
......Market services 7.1     16.3   19.0   35.5   14.5   24.9   
.........Distribution 3.5     7.6     14.0   25.1   14.2   21.2   
.........Finance & Business 13.0   24.6   28.9   46.2   19.2   32.1   
.........Personal 6.1     13.9   16.3   28.0   9.1     20.0   
......Non-market services 15.6   22.6   25.8   32.4   18.2   18.0   
EU US Japan
 
Note: Compensation of high-skilled workers as a percentage of value added, see equation (7). Skill 
definitions differ across countries (see discussion in section IV) and figures can only be used for 
intertemporal analysis. 
Source: see Table 2. 
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Table 10      Compensation of ICT-capital as share of value added (%) 
1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005
TOTAL 1.8 3.8 2.4 5.6 2.0 4.5
…ICT PRODUCTION 6.7 12.1 11.9 18.6 8.8 13.8
...GOODS 1.2 2.4 0.8 4.6 0.8 2.0
......Manufacturing 1.4 2.9 1.0 5.4 0.9 2.1
......Other goods 1.0 1.6 0.6 3.6 0.6 1.9
...SERVICES 1.7 3.7 2.1 5.1 2.0 4.6
......Market services 2.6 5.5 3.4 7.6 2.6 6.6
.........Distribution 1.5 3.9 1.7 5.8 0.9 3.3
.........Finance & Business 4.6 8.2 6.9 10.8 7.7 13.1
.........Personal 1.8 2.1 1.2 1.8 0.3 2.1
......Non-market services 0.8 1.4 0.7 2.1 1.0 1.6
EU US Japan
 
Note: Compensation of ICT-capital as a percentage of value added, see equation (8). ICT-capital 
includes computers, telecommunication equipment and software.  
Source: see Table 2. 
 
 
 

